We present a solution to the Tiercé problem, in which two players want to know whether they have backed the same combination (but neither player wants to disclose its combination to the other one). The problem is also known as the socialist millionaires' problem, in which two millionaires want to know whether they happen to be equally rich. In our solution, both players will be convinced of the correctness of the equality test between their combinations and will get no additional information on the other player's combination. Our solution is fair : one party cannot get the result of the comparison while preventing the other one from getting it. The protocol requires O(k) exponentiations only, where k is a security parameter.
Introduction

Description of the problem
Two players both have decided to back a combination for the coming Tiercé 1 . The players want to know whether they happen to back the same combination, but neither player wants to simply disclose its combination to the other. This problem is called the Tiercé problem [19] or the socialist millionaires' problem [10] . It is a variant of the millionaires' problem, introduced by Yao [17, 18] , in which two players wish to compare their riches: they wish to know who is richer, but apart from that they do not want to disclose any other information on their riches to each other. , interpreting x and y as nonnegative integers.) The basic security requirements for two-party protocols, and more generally, multi-party protocols have been laid out by Yao [17, 18] and by Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [9] .
Secure computation of f (x, y) thus means (i) that both players will be convinced of the correctness of the result, while (ii) neither player learns more about the other player's input than what is implied by the value of f (x, y). In particular, for f (x, y) = [x = y] this means that the player's do not get any information on each others values if x = y, except for the fact that the values are different. In addition, we may require the computation to be fair, which means that a player can not stop the protocol after getting the result of the comparison, and thereby preventing the other player from getting the result too.
For secure computations it is assumed that the players are committed to their inputs. A secure computation cannot guard against cheating players who do not behave according to their input values, e.g., by using a value x = x instead of x throughout the computation of [x = y]. Similarly, a secure computation for f (x, y) does not guard against cases in which the first player tries various values x 1 , . . . , x n for x to find out more about the value of y: if the second player happens to use the same y in these computations then the first player is allowed to learn everything that is implied by the knowledge of x 1 , . . . , x n and f (x 1 , y), . . . , f (x n , y).
For two-party computations it is also known that even for basic functions such as the binary AND and OR no secure computations exist which protect the inputs of both players at the same time in an information-theoretic way. We will therefore consider secure computations of [x = y] for which condition (ii) above holds subject to an intractability assumption, which will be the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption in our case.
A solution to the millionaires' problem is described by Salomaa in [14] (and also by Schneier [16] ). From this solution, we can easily deduce a solution to the Tiercé problem. However, such a solution is only efficient when x and y are very small (the complexity is exponential in the size of x and y). Jakobsson and Yung [10] presented a solution with polynomial complexity requiring O(k) exponentiations, where k is a security parameter, using many rounds of interaction. Moreover, all of these protocols fail to meet the fairness requirement.
In this paper we present a protocol with the same properties as the protocol by Jakobsson and Yung but requiring only O(1) exponentiations, and requiring a few rounds of interaction only. In addition, our protocol can be made fair, increasing the cost to O(k), where k is a security parameter.
Assumptions and Proofs of Knowledge
Notations
Let Z n denote the residue class ring modulo n and Z * n the multiplicative group of invertible elements in Z n . We let G q denote a group of large prime order q, such that computing discrete logarithms in this group is infeasible. For g, y ∈ G q , g = 1, we let log g y denote the discrete logarithm of y to the base g, which is equal to the unique x ∈ Z q satisfying y = g x . A common construction of G q is to take the unique subgroup of order q in Z * p , where p is a large prime such that q | p − 1. Finally, we let h : {0, 1} * → Z q denote a cryptographic hash function, i.e., h is one-way and collision-resistant and we use h(a, b) to denote the image under h of the concatenation of the strings a and b.
Assumptions
The security of our protocol involves three standard assumptions in cryptography.
The Discrete Logarithm (DL) assumption for group G q states that it is infeasible to compute log g y given random g, y ∈ G q , g = 1. Or, more formally, for all constants c and for all sufficiently large q, there exists no probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine which, on input G q , g, y, outputs log g y with probability greater than 1/|q| c .
The Diffie-Hellman (DH) assumption for group G q states that it is infeasible to compute g ab given random generators g, y 1 , y 2 ∈ G q , where a = log g y 1 and b = log g y 2 . Or, more concisely, it is infeasible to compute g ab given g, g a , g
The Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption for group G q states that it is infeasible to decide whether y = g ab given random generators g, y, y 1 , y 2 ∈ G q , where a = log g y 1 and b = log g y 2 . Or, more concisely, it is infeasible to decide whether c = ab (which is equivalent to g c = g ab ) given g, g a , g b , g c for random a, b, c ∈ Z q .
Our result requires the DDH assumption, which implies the DH assumption, which in turn implies the DL assumption. We will also use the equivalent formulation for DH which states that it is infeasible to compute g b given g, g a , g ab for random a, b ∈ Z q , and similarly for DDH.
The DDH assumption is equivalent to the semantic security [8] (indistinguishability of encryptions) of the ElGamal cryptosystem [6] . See [2] for a discussion of the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem.
Non-interactive proofs of knowledge
The following protocols are non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, and correspond to well-known interactive honest-verifier zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. The interactive protocols are converted to their noninteractive counterparts using the generic transformation introduced by Fiat and Shamir [7] . This transformation preserves the properties of the original protocol: Bob is convinced by Alice's proof if and only if she holds the secret whose knowledge she proves, and at the end of the protocol Bob will not have learned any information on Alice's secret. In fact, the resulting non-interactive proofs can be proven secure in the random oracle model of [3] (see [13] ).
In order to simplify the description of the proofs of knowledge we assume that the verifier (in this case Bob) already knows all the public parameters related to the assertion the prover (in this case Alice) wants to prove. Furthermore, to prevent that Alice and Bob may copy each other's proofs in our protocol for the socialist millionaires' problem, we assume that the inputs to the hash function are appropriately diversified, e.g. by including a string that identifies Alice or Bob and other diversifying information.
Proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm
Schnorr's protocol [15] allows Alice to prove to Bob that she knows an element x ∈ Z q satisfying y = g x , where y is Alice's public key. Alice randomly selects an integer r ∈ Z q , computes W = g r , c = h(W ), and D = r − xc mod q. Then Alice sends the proof (c, D) to Bob. Bob is convinced (accepts the proof ) if c = h(g D y c ).
Proof of knowledge of discrete coordinates
Okamoto's protocol [11] extends Schnorr's protocol to the case of two generators g 1 , g 2 , where log g 1 g 2 is unknown to both Alice and Bob. Using the protocol described below, Alice is able to prove to Bob that she knows x 1 , x 2 ∈ Z q satisfying y = g
, where y is Alice's public key. Alice randomly selects two integers r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z q , computes W = g
In contrast with Schnorr's protocol, this protocol is known to be provably witness-hiding [11] .
Proof of equality of two discrete logarithms
Consider the same setting as for Okamoto's protocol. The protocol described below allows Alice to prove to Bob that she knows an element x ∈ Z q satisfying y 1 = g x 1 and y 2 = g x 2 , where y 1 , y 2 is Alice's public key. Alice randomly selects r ∈ Z q , computes
. This protocol is due to Chaum and Pedersen [5] .
Proof of equality of two discrete coordinates
Similar to the extension of Schnorr's protocol to Okamoto's protocol, we extend the Chaum-Pedersen protocol to the case involving several generators. The protocol described below allows Alice to prove to Bob that she knows
and y 2 = g
2 , where y 1 , y 2 is Alice's public key. Alice randomly selects r 1 , r 21 , r 22 ∈ Z q , computes
. The protocol is easily adapted to the case in which y 2 involves a different pair of generators g 1 , g 2 instead of g 1 , g 2 .
Proof that a coordinate is equal to 0 or to 1
Consider the same setting as for Okamoto's protocol. Suppose that x 2 ∈ {0, 1}. The following protocol allows Alice to prove to Bob that she knows x 1 , x 2 with x 1 ∈ Z q and x 2 ∈ {0, 1} satisfying y = g
, where y is Alice's public key. In particular no information on x 2 other than the fact that it is in {0, 1} is revealed. This protocol is constructed using the technique due to Cramer, Damgård, and Schoenmakers [4] .
The protocol
It is instructive to first consider the following naive protocol for computing [x = y] securely. The players are called Alice and Bob. Let x be Alice's input and y be Bob's one. The protocol starts with Alice sending h(x) to Bob, followed by Bob sending h(y) to Alice, where h is a cryptographic hash function as above. If h(x) = h(y), then x = y with overwhelming probability, hence both players may correctly compute the output by evaluating [h(x) = h(y)]. However, the protocol is clearly not hiding the player's inputs, in the sense of semantic security [8] . For instance, Bob learns the value of h(x) even if x = y, which enables him to test candidate valuesx for x by comparing h(x) with h(x). The protocol is also not fair, as Bob may refuse to return anything after receiving h(x) from Alice.
The following protocol allows Alice and Bob to prove to each other that their respective secrets x and y are equal (or not) in such a way that Bob learns nothing about x and Alice learns nothing about y (except for the value of [x = y]). The protocol is well suited to the case that x and y are small.
Parameter generation
Alice and Bob (jointly) generate a group G q of a large prime order q (at least of size 160 bits), e.g., by taking G q as a subgroup of Z * p for a large prime p (say of size at least 1024 bits) such that q | p − 1, or, alternatively, by taking a group (of order q) of points on an elliptic curve. They also decide on generators g 0 , g 1 , g 2 of G q , for which they don't know log g i g j for i = j, 0 ≤ i, j < 3. The generation of such numbers does not pose problems. We assume, to simplify the description of the protocol, that x and y are elements of Z q (if x or y is larger than q, then we use this protocol to compare h(x) and h(y) instead).
Development of the protocol
Let k be a security parameter, such that it is computationally infeasible to do 2 k computations in a human-scale time and with human-scale computation resources (nowadays, k is taken equal to 80). We need that k < |q|. In the protocol without fairness, k is set to 0.
Step 1
Alice generates g a = g xa 1 for random x a ∈ Z * q . Similarly, Bob generates g b = g
for random x b ∈ Z * q . They use Schnorr's protocol to prove knowledge of x a and x b , respectively. They also check that g a = 1 and
, which can be computed by both Alice and Bob. 
Step 2
Alice selects a random element a ∈ Z q and a random number e, 0 ≤ e < 2 k , and computes
Using the protocols of Section 2 she shows that there indeed exists an a ∈ Z q for which she knows e, x ∈ Z q satisfying (1). Depending on whether we want to design a fair or a non-fair protocol, Alice and Bob perform to following:
• (Fair Version) Alice shows that she knows a, e ∈ Z q with 0 ≤ e < 2 k by choosing random a i ∈ Z q and e i ∈ {0, 1}, i = 0, . . . , k − 1 subject to the condition that a = k−1 i=0 a i 2 i mod q and e = k−1 i=0 e i 2 i , and setting
0 , i = 0, . . . , k−1. This kind of splitting has been used before in [1] . Then she proves that each e i is in {0, 1} using the last protocol of Section 2. Since Alice can only know one pair a, e satisfying P a = g a 3 g e 0 , it follows that (P a , Q a ) is correctly computed by Alice. If Alice finds a , e with a = a modq (hence e = e) satisfying P a = g 
where b ∈ Z q and f , 0 ≤ f < 2 k are randomly chosen.
• (Version without fairness) Alice and Bob set e = f = 0, P a = g a 3 and
Step 3
In this step, Alice and Bob both compute (P a /P b , Q a /Q b ), which will be of the form:
Then Alice produces
and a proof that log g 1 g a = log Qa/Q b R a to show that R a is correctly formed. Similarly, Bob produces
and a corresponding proof. Now Alice and Bob both know on account of (3) and the definition of g 3 that
Step 4
Finally, Alice and Bob fairly disclose the values of e and f . Once these values are released both Alice and Bob (but not anyone else) may determine whether x = y by testing whether
On account of (3) and (4) This step can be regarded as fair, because if Bob (for example) deliberately aborts the protocol at i = l say, he will be only at most one bit ahead of Alice to test, by exhaustive search, the combinations for the missing bits e 0 , . . . , e l .
Security
We will consider the security with respect to correctness, privacy, and fairness, where we will consider Bob as the adversary and Alice as the honest party. However, we could reverse these roles as our results are symmetric in nature and hide information both ways.
For the security proofs, we will consider two different kind of attacks: passive attacks and active attacks. In the former case, the (passive) adversary correctly follows the specifications of the protocol. Such adversaries model attacks that take place after the protocol has been completed, and may involve either Alice or Bob. In the latter case, the adversary may be active during the protocol and deviate from it. In particular, he does not necessarily make random choices when it is prescribed in the definition of the protocol. Security against such an adversary means that there is no strategy that increases the amount of information that this adversary learns about the secret of the other party.
Correctness means that at the end of the protocol Alice and Bob are convinced of the validity of the result of the comparison of their respective secrets. This is achieved by the (non-interactive) proofs of knowledge given by Alice and Bob, which show that the values exchanged in the various protocol steps are of the intended form. This implies that test (5) at the end of the protocol is correct.
Privacy (or secrecy) means that the protocol hides the private inputs of Alice and Bob, which are x and y respectively. We have the following results which imply that the protocol is secure against passive attacks.
Security against passive attacks
Clearly, if x = y, Bob will learn Alice's secret. If x = y we have to show that Bob learns no information about Alice's secret. As the (non-interactive) proofs (of knowledge) used during this protocol are zero-knowledge, the only information learnt by Bob are the following values produced by Alice:
xa , e. Since e is released by Alice, and Bob knows x b , b, and y, Bob essentially learns g
w , x a = u, a = v, and reordering, we may summarize this by saying that for a generator g, Bob essentially learns g u , g uv , g uw , g v+w .
To prove that the protocol is secure against passive attacks that fully recover the value of x, we must prove that Bob is not able to compute x from g u , g uv , g uw , g v+w . For this, it is sufficient to prove that he is not able to compute g x−y 2 = g w from g u , g uv , g uw , g v+w . By using the following lemma, we conclude that under the Diffie-Hellman assumption, the protocol is secure against passive attacks that fully recover the value of x.
Lemma 1 Under the DH assumption it is infeasible to compute
Proof: Suppose we have an oracle computing g w given g u , g uv , g uw , g v+w , for random u, v, w ∈ Z q . Then we show how to compute g b given α = g a , β = g ab for random a, b ∈ Z q , hence contradicting the DH assumption. The reduction is as follows. Set γ = g ac , for random c ∈ Z q , and give α, β, γ/β, g c to the oracle. Since this tuple is equal to g a , g ab , g a(c−b) , g c the oracle returns g c−b , from which we obtain g c /g
To prove that the protocol is secure against passive attacks that only partially recover the value of x, we must prove that Bob is not able to decide whether a candidate valuex is equal to x (unlike the naive protocol). Writing g t = gx −y 2 , it is sufficient for this to prove that Bob is not able to decide whether t is equal to w given g t , g u , g uv , g uw , g v+w . By using the following lemma, we conclude that under the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption, the protocol is also secure against this type of passive attacks.
Lemma 2 Under the DDH assumption it is infeasible to decide whether t = w correctly from g t , g u , g uv , g uw , g v+w , for random t, u, v, w ∈ Z q .
Proof: Suppose we have an oracle deciding t = w given g t , g u , g uv , g uw , g v+w , for random t, u, v, w ∈ Z q . Then we show how to decide whether b = c given α = g a , β = g ab , g c for random a, b, c ∈ Z q , hence contradicting the DDH assumption. The reduction is as follows. Set γ = g ad , for random d ∈ Z q , and give g d−c , α, β, γ/β, g d to the oracle. Since this tuple is equal to Note that Lemma 2 may also be interpreted as follows in relation to the semantic security of ElGamal encryption. Informally, an encryption scheme is semantically secure if ciphertexts leak no information about the plaintext, i.e., the scheme is secure against a passive adversary.
Corollary 3 Let y = g
x denote the public key corresponding to private key x ∈ Z q . Suppose that the value of m 1/x is given in addition to an ElGamal encryption (g r , y r m) of message m, where r ∈ Z q is random. Then ElGamal encryption is still semantically secure.
Finally, the fairness of the fair version of our protocol is straightforward. Both Alice and Bob are unable to compute the result of the comparison before the beginning of the step 4. Moreover, during the fourth step, Bob's advantage over Alice is at most one bit. So, if Bob decides to abort the protocol and tries to search the remaining bits by exhaustive research, Alice needs no more than twice as much time compared to Bob to compute the same result.
Security against active attacks
So far we have only considered the case of passive adversaries. Now we will extend the arguments developed above to the case of active adversaries. We will show that our protocol remains secure even in this case, provided that g 2 is jointly computed by Alice and Bob. The random oracle model , formalized by Bellare and Rogaway [3] , will be used to model the behaviour of the hash function h underlying the various non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of our protocol. In this model, the hash function is replaced by an oracle which produces a truly random value (in the range of the function) when queried. For identical queries, the same answers are given. Various cryptographic schemes using hash functions have been proved secure in this model. In particular, Pointcheval and Stern [13] provided security proofs for signature schemes derived from honest-verifier zero-knowledge identification schemes.
In our proofs below, all parties (including the adversary) will be modeled by probabilistic polynomial time interactive Turing machines with access to the random oracle. As in the passive case, we will consider two types of attacks: active attacks that fully recover the secret x and active attacks that only partially recover this value. We will prove the following result.
Lemma 4 Under the Diffie-Hellman assumption and assuming the random oracle model, the (modified) protocol for the socialist millionaires' problem is secure against active attacks that fully recover Alice's secret.
The above result can be easily extended to the security against attacks that only partially recover the value of x.
Lemma 5 Under the Diffie-Hellman assumption and assuming the random oracle model, the (modified) protocol for the socialist millionaires' problem is secure against active attacks that only partially recover Alice's secret.
We will only prove the third lemma. The other lemma can be proved in a similar way, as in the passive case. Also, it suffices to consider the version of the protocol that does not address fairness, as the additions to make the protocol fair are not essential to our argument below.
For our proof, we need to slightly modify the original protocol. We require that Alice and Bob, in addition to g 3 , jointly compute g 2 . So, Alice generates
for random x a 2 ∈ Z * q . Similarly, Bob generates g b 2 = g
for random x b 2 ∈ Z * q . They use Schnorr's protocol to prove knowledge of x a 2 and x b 2 , respectively. They also check that g a 2 = 1 and
, which can be computed by both Alice and Bob.
We are now assuming that Bob is the active adversary (the analysis of the case in which Alice is the adversary is essentially the same). This means that Bob will choose his values (x b , x b 2 , b, and y) in a 'clever' way rather than truly random as specified in the protocol description. However, the messages he will send will be in accordance with the protocol. Our security proof is based on a reduction argument; we prove that if an active adversary Bob (viewed as a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine) can find, with non-negligible probability, x, hence g x 2 , given the information 'seen' during the execution of the protocol, then this adversary can be used to build a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine which contradicts the DH assumption (we can easily adapt the proof to the DDH setting). Here the probability is taken over the random tapes of Alice and Bob, the random oracles, the public parameters G q , g 1 and the integer x. For simplicity, we will not write in the sequel the dependencies on the security parameter |q|, but when we say that an expression f is non-negligible, this means that f depends on |q| and that there exists a positive integer c such that f (|q|) is larger than 1/ |q| c for all sufficiently large |q|.
(where x a and a are random and unknown) be an instance of the DH problem (see also Section 2.2). We want to obtain γ = g a 1 . We will see how we can use Bob to compute this value. We will 'convert' this instance to an input to our protocol, and exhibit a simulator S (a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine) capable of simulating the three steps of our protocol in such a way that the adversary Bob cannot distinguish a real interaction with Alice from a simulated one. Bob will be used as a resettable black box . In other words, the simulator will have control over its tapes, and will have the ability to bring Bob to a halt and restart it in its starting state at any time it wishes. All the simulations will be performed under the random oracle model. S will play Alice's role and will speak first in the protocol.
Step 1
S sends α to Bob. Since S doesn't know x a , the proof required at this step is simulated. In the random oracle model, where S has a full control of the values returned by the oracle, this proof can easily be simulated. In order to produce this proof, S randomly chooses c ∈ Z q and D ∈ Z q . S then defines the output of the random oracle on the input (query) W = g
c to be c (which means that c = h (W )). Then S sends the proof (c, D) to Bob. Note that S produces tuples (c, D) with an distribution identical to the one produced by a real prover knowing x a . This is due to the honest verifier zero-knowledge property (special honest verifier zero-knowledge in fact [4] ) of Schnorr's interactive protocol (see also [12] for the proof that such distributions are the same). . If this proof is not correct S aborts the protocol. At this point S needs to obtain the discrete logarithm x b in order to carry on with its simulation. By using the technique developed by Pointcheval and Stern [13] and known as the oracle replay attack (forking lemma) one can easily obtain this value: if we replay Bob, with the same random tape and a different oracle, Bob will produce, with non-negligible probability and in polynomial time 
for random x a 2 ∈ Z * q and uses Schnorr's protocol to prove knowledge of x a 2 (since S really knows x a 2 this is a real proof not a simulated one). Bob then sends g b 2 to Alice along with a proof of knowledge (in the random oracle model) of x b 2 the discrete logarithm of g b 2 to the base g 1 . Again, by using the oracle replay attack, S can find the value
. So at the end of step 1, Alice knows x b and x b 2 .
Step 2
S randomly selects an element d ∈ Z q and computes
So, we have P a = g = β x b . Again, S can compute this value since it extracted x b from Bob. Following the definition of g 2 , we have:
We put
, where the simulator does not know a. Since d is a random element of Z q , x is uniformly distributed in Z q and consequently constitutes a choice that a real Alice could have made. S sends (P a , Q a ) to Bob and must also prove that it knows a and x satisfying (P a , Q a ) = (g
. Since S does not know a, the proof required at this step is simulated. In order to produce this proof, S randomly chooses c, D 1 , D 2 ∈ Z q , and then defines the output of the random oracle on input W 1 , W 2 with W 1 = g Using the oracle replay attack, S can find b and y (note that S now knows x b , x b 2 , b and y).
Step 3
In this step, S and Bob both first compute (P a /P b , Q a /Q b ), which will be of the form:
( S can compute this value since it knows d, b, y, x a 2 and x b 2 . S sends R a to Bob along with a proof that log g 1 α = log Qa/Q b R a . Since S does not know x a , the proof required at this step is simulated. To produce this proof,S randomly chooses c, D ∈ Z q . S then defines the output of the random oracle on input W 1 , W 2 with W 1 = g W 2 ) ). S then sends the proof (c, D) to Bob. As before, the special honest verifier zero-knowledge property of the interactive protocol underlying this proof of knowledge ensures that S produces tuples (c, D) with a distribution indistinguishable from those that would be produced by a real prover knowing x a . The simulator 's part of the protocol is now complete.
Since the distribution of the simulated views is indistinguishable from that produced by a 'real' Alice (not a simulated one), Bob, after the interaction with S, will be able, as assumed, to find with non-negligible probability g 
Conclusion
We have presented a protocol which allows one to fairly check the equality (or the inequality) of two secrets x and y, and this gives an answer to the Tiercé problem. Counting the number of exponentiations, the complexity of our protocol is O(1) in its simple version (without fairness) and O(k) in its fair version, where k is a security parameter. However, designing an efficient solution to the millionaires' problem, which asks one to test whether x < y, remains an open problem.
